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KANT'S SUBJ ECTIVIST THEORY OF SPACE

MARK C. TIMMONS
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

In his 1780 Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant rejects those objectivist views of space according to which space belongs to the order of
things in themselves, either as itself a thing in itself (Newton), or reducible to properties of things in themselves (Leibniz), and argues for
a subjectivist alternative. What this subjectivist view comes to is unclear.
This paper provides an analysis of a few key passages from the Kritik in
an attempt to reconstruct Kant's doctrine of space.

t t t
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues for a subjectivist theory of space, and while the philosophical considerations that (he thinks) necessitate such a view are made
reasonably clear, what this subjectivist account comes to is
unclear. Much of the unclarity is due to such expressions as
"form of appearance," "subjective condition of sensibility,"
"outer intuition," and so on, which are constantly used by
Kant to characterize his view. Hence, in this essay I intend to
investigate, in some detail, the meanings of certain key terms
and expressions, a correct understanding of which is indispensible for interpreting Kant's doctrine of space. This project
will provide, I hope, the necessary groundwork for any future
study of Kant's theory of space.
A clear statement of what I shall refer to as the Transcendental Aesthetic doctrine of space (T.A. doctrine) reads:
(I) Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of
outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone, outer intuition is possible
for us (A26, B42).

First in the order of clarification is an examination of the
relationship between the expressions "form of all appearances" and "form of intuition." In the Kritik, Kant uses them
interchangeably. This is because here the logical doctrine of
intuition is connected with the metaphysical doctrine of
sensibility. The logical sense of intuition serves to distinguish
this notion from that of concept. Both are modes of knowledge: by intuition a representing creature is put into an imme-

diate relation to an object, this representation being single;
while through concepts, the subject is mediately related to
objects by the representation of features common to several
objects falling under the concept. The point is that intuition
as contrasted with conception depends somehow upon an
immediate presence of an object to consciousness. In human
beings that faculty of intuitive awareness is sensibility. Our
intuition, then, is sensible and depends for its operation
upon sensory stimulation from independently existing objects ..
The result of this sort of intuition (empirical intuition) is what
Kant calls "appearance," the datum of possible experience
(A 119). "Appearance," defined as "the undetermined object
of an empirical intuition" (B34 A20), is a composite of matter
(sensation) and form (space and time). An appearance, then, is
that mode of consciousness in human beings through which
we are put into an immediate relation to objects. This sort of
connection between intuition generally and sensibility enables
Kant to use "form of intuition" (meaning empirical intuition)
and "form of appearance" interchangeably.
Returning now to the above quoted passage, consider first
the phrase "form of all appearances of outer sense." What can
it mean to say that space is the form of anything? A clue to an
understanding of this can be gained by considering Kant's
talk of the forms of judgment.
Kant defines judgments as functions of unity among
mediate representations, i.e., concepts. A concept for Kant is
a principle of unity by which we can represent a number of
immediate representations (intuitions) under one representation. That is, for Kant, a concept is a rule, the use of which
enables us to represent a number of representations immediately given to us in intuition. Now all thought is judgmental,
by which we relate or connect different concepts together
according to certain patterns. Each pattern of connection
represents a possible logical form for thought, which, taken
collectively, exhaustively represents the logical structure for
all thinking whatsoever. What this comes to is this: for any
syntactically coherent utterance or thought, e.g., "all bodies
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are heavy," we can abstract from its content (i.e., the predicates and individual constants) and consider its form in isolation, which in this case is "all---are .... " Now the structural
features of any thought may be separated into quantity,
quality, relation, and modality. The judgment in question is
universal, affirmative, categorical, and assertoric, corresponding respectively to these general structural features. Further,
these features represent the most generic features of judgment
qua judgment. The point is that to judge at all is to combine
or relate concepts in certain patterns such that unless one's
judgment exemplifies one of the forms, one simply has not
offered a meaningful judgment. For Kant, then, the (logical)
forms of thought or judgment are the limits or permissible
ways in which one can meaningfully judge.
Applying this to the notion "form of sensible appearance," it follows that insofar as space is a form, it represents
some sort of structure to which all sense content must conform if intuition is to take place at all. We might say, then,
that space represents patterns of connection holding between
the elements of intuitive awareness.
Clearly, though, more is involved here. Given this much,
Kant's view is compatible with those of both his empiricist
and rationalist predecessors. Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz,
for instance, all hold that space is a fundamental feature of
experience in the sense explained above, i.e., that the possibility of knowledge of objects presupposes space. What makes
Kant's view unique and interesting is the further claim that
space, in some special sense, represents the elementary, a priori
structure of outer appearance. Kant says that this form or
structure is that which "so determines the manifold of appearances that it allows of being ordered" (B34, A20). To understand this phrase, let us turn to the second sentence of the
quotation.
The phrases "form of sensible appearance" and "subjective condition of sensibility" seem to be used synonymously
in A26, B42. Consider the latter phrase. What does it mean to
say that space is a necessary or universally-valid condition of
sensibility? Generally, to say that something X is a necessary
condition for something else Y is to make the counterfactual
assertion that if X were to be removed or not to occur, then Y
would not occur. Using this admittedly rough analysis of
"necessary condition," we might say that if space, which has
its seat in the mind, were to be removed, no representation of
objects would be possible. (Presumably this would cover
both immediate and mediate representations.)

Kant's doctrine: space, as a necessary condition of sensibility,
is subjective in origin. That is, space--the structure of all
intuitive representation in us-has its source in the human
mind as a feature of our faculty of sensibility. Thus, from the
foregoing we can say that, for Kant, space just is a necessary
subjective condition of sensibility, understanding the under_
scored phrase in the way explained above.
Still, matters are not as clear as they might be, for what
sense does it make to say that space is a condition of sensible
awareness? Again, let us assume that talking of X's being a
necessary condition for Y can be "unpacked" counterfactu.
ally. But the question here concerns what sort of "thing"
this necessary condition of sensibility is. Or better (thOUgh not
necessarily more perspicuous), what is the nature of thi!
subjective condition called space? It seems quite peculiar t(]
identify space with a necessary condition of some sort.
Consider, for a moment, talk of necessary conditions
Such talk typically arises in connection with talk of causation
In most accounts, the relata of the causal relation are event!
or activities. Thus, in the context of Kant's doctrine, I suggesl
that to talk of space as a necessary condition, space must b(
looked upon as an originally given mental activity; or better
since it is part of our mental makeup and "exists" anteceden
to any actual experience, space is a mental capacity. Just as,
necessary condition for a piece of glass to shatter upon impac
is that it must have a certain sort of capacity, i.e., to breal
upon impact, so also we must possess the capacity of beinl
able to represent spatially if we are to have intuitions. Morl
precisely, space, on this account, is to be understood as ,
mental disposition, a disposition manifested as a manner 0
arranging or combining the sensible data (sensations) givel
through outer sense.
This, I suggest, is the most plausible way of reading thos
passages in the Transcendental Aesthetic in which space i
identified as "the subjective condition under which we ca
have outer intuition." Indeed, the foregoing should shed som
light on Kant's definition of "form of appearance" ("that i
which alone the sensation can be posited and ordered ... ")the ordering and positing being a capacity of the mind, whic
in the case of outer sensation is called space.
No doubt, further clarification and defense are needed il
behalf of this interpretation. To this end, consider a numb.
of passages that suggest this view. Speaking generally, Kar
says:

\

But again, this is quite compatible with opposing objectivist theories. Newton, who held that space is an immaterial,
independently-existing entity in which all things are placed,
would no doubt argue that without space, human perceptual
awareness of objects would be impossible.
This brings us finally to the distinguishing feature of
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(2) In every being the constituent elements of it (essel
tialius) are the matter and the mode in which the
are combined ... (B222).
(3) Space itself, however, is nothing but an inner mod
of representation in which certain perceptions al
connected with one another (B43).

(4) ... the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our
faculty of representation, without being anything
more than the mode in which the subject is affected
(B130).
(5) The merely subjective state of the representing subject, insofar as the manifold is given in a special
manner (for its intuiting and synthetic unity), is
called "sensibility"; and this manner of intuition,
given a priori, is the sensible form of intuition (Letter
to Beck, 20 January, 1792).
(My emphasis throughout.)
I think the best way of understanding this talk of mode
and manner is in terms of mental capacity or disposition, as
explained above.
In order to strengthen this interpretation of the doctrine,
I turn to Kant's account of the synthesis of apprehension ex-

pounded in both A and B deductions of the categories. My
claim will be that space (and time) function as that manner
or way in which the imagination connects appearances in its
apprehenSion of the empirical content of intuition. That is,
space (and time) represent the peculiar manner in which the
data of empirical intuition are taken up and put together
by the imagination. Of course, to clarify this we need to explain Kant's notion of the synthesis of apprehenSion.
Recall that sensations for Kant are the raw data of empirical intuition, i.e., the mental effects due to the affection of
our senses by independently existing objects. As such, sensations have no extensive magnitude, i.e., are nonspatial in
character.
ApprehenSion by means merely of sensation occupies
only an instant, if, that is, I do not take into account the
succession of different sensations. As sensation is that
element in the [field of appearance] the apprehension of
which does not involve a succession synthesis proceeding
from the parts to the whole representation, it has no extensive magnitude (B209).
This passage is important and may be explained as follows. Considered in isolation, apart from the successive synthesis of apprehension, sensations as such are non-extended
magnitudes-they are intrinsically nonspatial in character.
They are, that is, mere mental affections arising in us in a
particular manner. If we consider sensations individually,
our apprehension of each of them would not involve successive synthesis and hence not be spatially extended. It is
the successive synthesis of apprehension of sensations that
results in the appearances-i.e., sensations plus form. Space, it
seems, is a manner of connecting sensations to generate
appearances.
Appearances, then, are the result of the synthesis of

apprehension. To substantiate this claim, consider the following remarks.
(7) The appearances, insofar as they are objects of consciousness, simply in virtue of being representations,
are not in any way distinct from their apprehension,
that is, from their reception in the synthesis of
imagination; and we must therefore agree that the
manifold of appearances is always generated in the
mind successively (A190).

(8) The appearances are, in their apprehension themselves, nothing but an empirical synthesis in space
and time, and are given only within this synthesis
(A499).
The following seems to emerge from (6) and (7): appearances are initially "given" only through a certain synthesizing
activity of the imagination. Appearances are thus the result
of an activity of the imagination. It is the successive combining
of sensation, which takes place in a certain manner, that
results in appearances-the data of all knowledge. Space lies
at the basis of this synthesis.
This way of looking at things is further substantiated by
remarks in the B deduction of the categories.
(9) First of all, I may draw attention to the fact that by
synthesis of apprehension I understand that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, ~here
by perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the
intuition (as appearances), is possible (B160).
(10) In the representation of space and time we have a
priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition;
and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the
manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place
at all (B160).
(11) When, for instance, by apprehension of the manifold
of a house, I take the empirical intuition of it intQ a
perception, the necessary unity of space and of outer
sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my
apprehension (B162).
In (9), Kant in effect is saying that synthesis of apprehension is a combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition,
i.e., a combination of sensations which result in appearance.
In (10) and (11), Kant is saying that space (and time) lie at
the basis of this synthesis, i.e., as the manner in which sensations are combined.
To sum up: We began with the phrase "form of intuition," the explication of which led to an analysis of what
Kant means in claiming that space is a subjective condition
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of sensible intuition. We found that, originally, space is a mental capacity, which on the occasion of sensible stimulation is
the manner or mode in which the imagination combines
appearances in what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension.
Some brief clarifying comments are in order. One may be
inclined to ask what precisely is this manner or mode of
imagination identified with space. To characterize space as
some sort of imaginative capacity for combination of sensation is mysterious.
All that can be said here is that sensations are combined
by the activity of the imagination in a spatial manner. One of
the fundamental tenets of Kant's doctrine of space, first expounded in the 1768 essay "Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation in Space," is that spatial relations
are sui generis, i.e., not reducible to any other set of relations
or properties of objects. Thus, all that can be said about this
manner of combination is that it is spatial in character.
It might be objected that, insofar as I have made space a

capacity of the imagination, I have made the imagination a
part of sensibility. But, as Kant says, sensibility is a receptive,
i.e., passive faculty of knowledge; hence, the imagination,
which functions to combine or synthesize mental data, is a
feature of the understanding.
Without pursuing matters too far, it is clear that the
doctrine of imagination in Kant is obscure. It simply is not
clear whether the imagination properly belongs to sensibility
or the understanding, or has its feet in both. (I incline toward
the latter view.) In Kant's Anthropology, which in part is
Kant's psychological theory, it is interesting to note that
imagination is in fact classified as a power of the faculty of
sensibility.

A connected problem may be stated as follows: Kant
seems to hold that space and time, as forms of all sensible
intuition, comprise a receptive capacity, i.e., a capacity to be
affected in certain ways. In my view, it seems that space is no
mere receptive form but an active source of knowledge, seated
in the imagination. Now if we consider the active/passive
division Kant makes between the two fundamental sources of
knowledge, it seems that the distinction is really between
spontaneous mental activity and receptive non-activity. Presumably, the central idea here is that there are two sources of
knowledge: from one source we receive data upon which the
other operates. The result is experience. Now, insofar as the
objection above makes any sense at all, it is claimed that in
my interpretation, space acts upon the data of experience,
whereas Kant explicitly says that space is a manner of being
affected.
My response is that it is the imagination which is active
in combining the data of the senses, while space merely represents the manner in which this combination takes place.
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Space, in my view, then, need not be understood as an active
capacity itself.
There are two final points that should be made in con_
nection with my interpretation. There are a number of places
in which Kant holds that space and time are produced or generated by a synthesis of the productive imagination. Here We
must be careful to avoid being misled by an ambiguity in
Kant's use of "space." Space, as form of intuition and under_
stood as a mental capacity, is not generated. I do not think
such a claim would even make sense. On the other hand, Kant
holds that a combination of appearances is represented as
extended objects in space. The space in which things are
located can be said to be produced as a result of the synthetic
activity of the imagination. "Space" in the latter sense is caned
"empirical space" (see Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science), the blueprint for which has its source in the imagination.
Note that talk of the production of space is quite consistent with the T .A. doctrine of space according to which space
is originally given as a single unified and infmite manifold.
Space, that is, does not consist of (spatial) parts that combine
to form one, all-embracing space. Rather, space is an innate
capacity of unification and, as such, each so-called empirical
space produced represents one determinate result of this
activity. To speak of empirical spaces, i.e., "different" spaces,
presupposes some way of differentiating them. But obviously,
since it makes no sense to talk of space as some object of
awareness, empirical space (insofar as this phrase has meaning)
simply denotes a certain position holding among the objects
represented. Thus, to speak of different spaces as part of one
all-embracing space is really elliptical for talk about situations
of objects relative to one another, the possibility of which presupposes that they are represented in a unified manner-3
spatial manner.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant says that space is
given, i.e., it is an intuition that "must be found in us prior
to any perception of an object" (B41). This seems to suggest
that space lies in us as an innate representation. In On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of Pure Reason
Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (1790), Kant
denies this:
The Critique admits absolutely no divinely implanted or
innate representation. It regards them all, whether they
belong to intuition or not as acquired (Allison, 1973).
The problem here is with the words "given" and "intuition," which have misled some commentators. Kant claims
that the objects of intuition are given to us as sensations. This,
of course, does not mean that they are in any way innate.
Sensations result from the affection of unknown things in
themselves upon the senses. The use of the term "given" is
presumably to emphasize that sensations are not the result of

any mental activity. Certainly space is not "given" in this
sense. If Kant is correct in 1790 about this doctrine of the
Kritik, then space is not given in the sense of being an innate
intuition.
The meaning of "space as given" is made clear in Kant's
1790 response to Eberhard:
There must, however, be a ground in the subject which
makes it possible for these representations to originate
in this and no other manner, and which enables them to
be related to objects which are not given. The ground
at least is innate (Allison, 1973).
The ground, of course, is the mental capacity to relate sensible items spatially. That which is generated, i.e., empirical
space, when considered apart from empirical data, is space as
a pure, homogeneous manifold which is originally acquired.
But this original acquisition, i.e., space as a pure homogeneous
manifold, leads us to Kant's doctrine of formal intuition, a
topic requiring separate and detailed treatment.
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